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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
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KYLE A. FULLER,
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)
)

NO. 46684-2019
BOUNDARY COUNTY NO. CR-2017-1136

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kyle Fuller pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, was sentenced to a unified
term of four years, with two years fixed, and was initially placed on probation. After violating
the terms of his probation, having his probation revoked, and being sent on a rider, the district
court relinquished jurisdiction. Mr. Fuller asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
relinquishing jurisdiction, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging Mr. Fuller committed the cnmes of
possession of methamphetamine and petit theft by possession of stolen property, and he was
further alleged to be a persistent violator.

(R., pp.12-14.) Mr. Fuller waived his right to a

preliminary hearing, was bound over into the district court, and an information was filed
charging him with possession of methamphetamine and transferring a stolen vehicle, 1 as well as
alleging a persistent violator enhancement.

(R., pp.20-26.)

Mr. Fuller entered into a plea

agreement with the State, pleading guilty to possession of methamphetamine; in exchange, the
State dismissed the remaining charge and the sentencing enhancement, and agreed to recommend
retained jurisdiction, with an underlying sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence
imposed. (R., pp.32-42.) The district court sentenced Mr. Fuller to a unified term of four years,
with two years fixed, to run consecutively to sentences imposed in separate cases from Bonner
County, and the district court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Fuller on probation.
(R., pp.45-54.)
A week later, the State filed a report of probation violations, alleging that Mr. Fuller
violated the terms of his probation in a variety of ways. (R., pp.57-64; Tr. 5/29/18, p.17, L.23 p.22, L.14.) Mr. Fuller admitted to violating the terms of his probation by committing the crime
of trespassing, failing to report to probation and parole, failing to provide his probation officer
with his address, failing to contact a treatment provider, failing to appear for a scheduled urine
analysis, failing to provide a urine sample, and testing positive for controlled substances.

1

The prosecutor later acknowledged that the transferring a stolen vehicle charge should not have
been included in the information, as it was not alleged in the criminal complaint. (R., pp.32-33.)
In any event, the second charge was dismissed as part of a plea agreement, and no issues related
to this error are raised in this appeal. (R., pp.32-42.)
2

(R., pp.72-74; Tr. 7/9/18, p.7, L.4 - p.9, L.6.) The district court revoked Mr. Fuller's probation
and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.75-77; Tr. 7/9/18, p.14, L.2 -p.15, L.2.) Five months later, the
district court received a letter from the Department of Correction recommending that the court
relinquish jurisdiction. (PSI, p.39.) 2 During the rider review hearing, counsel for Mr. Fuller
asked the district court for "another retained rider." 3 (Tr. 12/20/18, p.8, Ls.13-18.) Instead, the
district court relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.87-89; Tr. 12/20/18, p.12, Ls.3-6.) Mr. Fuller
filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.92-94.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, in light of the mitigating
factors that exist in this case?

ARGUMENT
In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case, The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction
Mr. Fuller asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction
in his case. Sentencing decisions, including decisions regarding whether to retain or relinquish
jurisdiction, are left to the sound discretion of the district court, and are reviewed on appeal
under the well-established abuse of discretion standard. The governing criteria or objectives of

2

Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and its attached documents will use the
designation "PSI," and will include the page numbers associated with the 58-page electronic file
containing those documents.
3
After counsel for Mr. Fuller made this request, the district court stated, "[a]nd when I retain
jurisdiction, I have jurisdiction for one year, to retain jurisdiction, there's not even time for you
to complete another rider even ifl were so inclined." (Tr. 12/20/18, p.11, Ls.8-11.) It appears,
therefore, that the district court did not consider counsel's request to be for a second rider with
no intervening period of probation, which is not allowed pursuant to LC. § 19-2601(4), but rather
a request for the court to continue retaining jurisdiction in order allow Mr. Fuller to continue
programmmg.
3

criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the

public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
The Department of Correction informed the court that Mr. Fuller had been receiving
mental health treatment while on his rider. (PSI, p.44.) As noted by his counsel during the rider
review hearing, there was no evidence in the record about the extent of Mr. Fuller's mental
health problems or the role those issues played in "his behavior or his resistance of treatment."
(Tr. 12/20/18, p.7, Ls.14-19.) Counsel asserted "[t]he question is how serious[ly] was his mental
health considered, or did the program just try to fit him in with the rest of the classes," and
counsel argued that additional time in the retained jurisdiction program would be useful so that
his mental health issues could be considered. (Tr. 12/20/18, p.7, L.20-p.8, L.18.)
Idaho Courts recognized that a defendant's mental health issues should be considered as a
mitigating factor by a court when making sentencing determinations. See, e.g., Hollon v. State,
132 Idaho 573 (1999). In light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case, Mr. Fuller asserts
the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fuller respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court with
instructions that the court retain jurisdiction, or for whatever other relief this court deems
appropriate.
DATED this 24th day of July, 2019.

Is/ Jason C. Pinder
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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